Paul Rousseau's recent discussions of existential suffering and proposal of clinical guidelines for the sedation of patients with intractable physical, mental or spiritual distress 1,2 are cogent, welcome contributions to the field of palliative medicine. His comments contain much to admire, including the emphasis on the patient's symptoms, not the patient's death, as the focus of care. His recommendation that the treatment (including drug dosages) be adjusted based on the patient's symptoms gives this sometimes controversial practice a sensible clinical platform that withstands rigorous ethical investigation (for example, utilizing Jonsen's four-box method 3 of clinical ethical analysis). Content notwithstanding, however, I most admire Rousseau's reviews for what they lackthe perpetuation of the linguistic quagmire, "terminal sedation."
Attributed to Robert E. Enck, MD, 4 the phrase "terminal sedation" is commonly used for the clinical practice of utilizing therapeutic sedation in imminently dying patients, as a means of palliating symptoms which are not ameliorated by other, less aggressive measures. Debate concerning the ethical implications of the practice has been, at times, lively-ranging from case descriptions praising its efficacy and humaneness 5 to editorials decrying it as "slow euthanasia." 6, 7 For most clinicians, however, the practice seems to be an acceptable method of treating patients with otherwise intractable symptoms, provided that the focus of drug titration is symptom relief, not the patient's death. 8, 9 This distinction appeals to the ethical principle of double effect: if the patient's death is an undesired but anticipated secondary effect of the treatment, this is allowable, as the secondary effect was not intended. 10 As this intervention grows in acceptance and in frequency, the use of the term "terminal sedation" to describe it should be abandoned. As Chater et. al. have pointed out, 11 the phrase is confusing, in that the object of the adjective "terminal" is not explicit. Does it apply to the sedation (implying that the object of the practice is sedating someone to death) or to the patient (implying that the patient is in the final stage of illness)? Since this ambiguity is always present, the phrase is often interpreted to imply intent to kill. This interpretation has the potential to restrict patient access of state-of-the art palliative care, by leaving patients and families confused about their physicians' intent, and by leaving physicians fearful that their palliative interventions will be wrongly prejudged as "mercy killing." 12, 13 These considerations not withstanding, many authors 8, 9, [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] (formerly including Rousseau himself 21 ) have persisted in describing the clinical practice of sedating terminally ill patients with intractable physical, mental, or spiritual distress as terminal sedation. In explaining their position, Quill and Byock maintain that doing so is necessary to distinguish sedation in antemortem care from sedation in other settings (such as the treatment of burn victims), and to lend a sense of gravitas to the sedation of the terminally ill. 22 I find this explanation unconvincing, in that the context of palliative sedation in the terminally ill inherently makes the practice both distinct, and unmistakably imbued with sobriety.
The next best alternatives offered by the literature (sedation for intractable distress in the dying 23 or sedation in the imminently dying, 24 ) are more precise, but neither is likely to become part of medical jargon. Unabbreviated, they are cumbersome, and their acronyms (SIDD or SID), although easy enough to say, are too similar to that of sudden infant death syndrome to avoid confusion. This leaves us with "palliative sedation," which is, of course, linguistically precise and clinically accurate. The etymology of the phrase implies sheltering (literally, "cloaking" 25 ) a patient from distress, via inducing a state of restfulness.
Surely, one might say, all this fuss over semantics is much ado about nothing. Hardly. Buber said that "what is within strives over and over again toward becoming language." 26 I have previously argued that the words we use in medical discourse reveal much about our truest conceptions (and subconscious assumptions) about the practice of the profession, 27, 28 and have offered a set of internally consistent definitions of clinical terms often confused within the field of palliative medicine. 29 I suspect that in this case, as well, the linguistic ambiguity (and lack of clarity) of the phrase "terminal sedation" discloses similar moral ambiguity (and lack of clarity) surrounding the clinical practice. Let us take, therefore, this opportunity to clearly and firmly state that the goal of palliative sedation is the relief of suffering via the titration of medications to the cessation of symptoms-not the cessation of life. Socrates warned that using words carelessly was the kind of sin that kills the soul. Perhaps he was right, for clarity of language can only follow, not precede, clarity of purpose and thought.
